Iran is not an ethnically homogeneous state. Persians constitute a majority, but the country is home to significant populations of Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, Turkmen, and other ethnic and linguistic minorities. These communities have their own histories of tension with the central government and their own relationships with the current political crisis — relationships that add a layer of complexity to an already complicated situation.
Kurdish communities in Iran’s northwest have long maintained distinct political identities and, in some cases, active opposition movements operating from bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. The current crisis creates both risks and opportunities for these communities: risks from increased security force presence and the potential for collective punishment, opportunities from the regime’s distraction with succession and war.
The Baluchi population in Iran’s southeast, concentrated in the Sistan and Baluchestan province, has historically been subject to some of the most severe marginalization in the country. Sunni Muslims in a Shia-dominated state, the Baluchis have been the target of regular security operations and have produced various armed groups over the years.
Arab communities in Khuzestan province, which sits atop Iran’s most significant oil reserves, have their own grievances related to economic exploitation and cultural suppression. The province has been the site of significant protests in recent years, and its population will be watching the current crisis with particular attention.
How the new leadership treats these minority communities — whether the crisis produces a more repressive posture or whether the need to consolidate national unity creates any space for accommodation — will be an early indicator of the direction of post-Khamenei governance. Historical patterns suggest that crisis produces repression rather than accommodation, but historical patterns are not immutable.